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INTRODUCTION  
 
Recent bilateral or regional trade arrangements in Europe, the Americas, and 
elsewhere or GATT’s multilateral approach after the Second World War are part of the 
debate surrounding different approaches to trade liberalization. In this regard, the 
historiography advances that the British 1846 unilateral repeal of the Corn Laws was 
not an overwhelming success in establishing free trade abroad. Indeed, according to 
classical accounts, the movement towards free trade only spread to the rest of Europe 
after the Anglo-French commercial treaty (known as Cobden-Chevalier Treaty) in 1860, 
mostly in the form of subsequent bilateral agreements between other parties.  
Experts in nineteenth-century trade policy like Paul Bairoch, J.V.C. Nye, 
Douglas Irwin and Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson argue that the Cobden-
Chevalier treaty was decisive in reducing tariff protection by spreading bilateral 
agreements containing the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause.1 For these authors, 
Cobden-Chevalier is regarded as the main episode in trade liberalization in this period, 
generating a harmonious period of free trade that compares favorably with the period 
before the 1860s or even with the more recent GATT era.  
Is it really true that Cobden-Chevalier was the turning point for nineteenth-
century trade liberalization outside Britain? Authors like Paul Sharp and Giovanni 
Federico emphasize that liberalization following the repeal of the Corn Laws was not, in 
fact, exclusive to Britain, and that the movement to lower tariff duties on agricultural 
products actually started well before 1846.2 Robert Pahre offers an interesting account 
                                                          
1
 Bairoch, Commerce exterieur and “European Trade Policy”; Nye, “Myth” and War; Irwin, “Multilateral 
and Bilateral Trade Policy” and “Free Trade”; O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization. 
2
 Sharp, “1846,” and Federico, “Corn Laws.” 
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of the liberalizing treaties in Europe that followed the formation of the German 
Zollverein in 1834,3 although these bilateral approaches were mostly focused on 
establishing ‘freedom of commerce’, that is, the possibility to trade internationally on 
more or less equal terms and reduced discrimination in shipping and related aspects of 
trading.  Recently, Olivier Accominotti and Marc Flandreau have cast doubt on the 
path-breaking importance of the Anglo-French treaty.4  They establish that trade 
liberalization, measured by the crude ‘tariff revenue divided by total import value’, 
actually made much more progress before 1860 than was generally believed, and 
suggest that it might have slowed down after 1860. In response to their results, Lampe 
highlighted that actually many commodities, especially agricultural goods, which 
otherwise figure very prominently in the historiography of market integration in the 
nineteenth century, were almost absent from the treaties. The bilateral treaties abolished 
prohibitions and reduced tariffs mostly on manufactured goods.  In these sectors duties 
had been much higher than on raw materials and semi-manufactures well into the 
1850s.5 However, Lampe focuses almost exclusively on Europe, even if he observes 
that U. S. tariffs on manufactured goods clearly went up in the same period.  
Most comparative studies focus on agricultural tariffs or price differentials or an 
unclear mix of prohibitive, protective and revenue-oriented tariffs as reflected by 
‘average tariff measures,’ and to a large extent start in 1870. This article identifies the 
timing of nineteenth-century liberalization and the extent of initial protectionism by 
measuring the level of tariffs on a representative set of manufactured goods in 41 
                                                          
3
 Pahre, Politics. 
4
 Accominotti and Flandreau, “Bilateral Trade Treaties”  
5
 Lampe, “Bilateral Trade Flows” and “Effects.” 
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countries and dependent territories around the world between 1846 and 1880.  While 
ultimately we would like to establish tariff levels for agricultural, mining and 
manufactured goods since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, this research starts with 
manufacturing goods and in 1846. 
Even if agricultural protection was a major obstacle to trade liberalization until 
the 1840s, protectionist arguments dealt with protecting manufactures to help domestic 
industrialization, and the literature on protectionism and development since Friedrich 
List does not believe that there is a protectionist “learning” period for agricultural 
producers.6 Although industrialization only spread to some “Western” countries in the 
nineteenth century, domestic production of manufactured goods like textiles, metals, 
leather or paper took place all over the world. The tariff structure for these articles, 
especially for more skill-intensive products, had a major influence on the future 
competitiveness and comparative advantage of domestic manufacturing.7   
Manufacturing was central to protection even though it accounted for less than 
half of total trade in the emerging world economy.8 In the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, agrarian primary products and minerals had very low tariffs and 
only some products of tropical agriculture, as well as those converted into alcoholic 
                                                          
6
 See Bairoch, Economics, pp. 17–18, 23, who discusses agricultural protectionism in the ‘Golden Era of 
European Free Trade’, including those of List’s The National System of Political Economy (1841). 
7
 Recent works on the relation between tariffs and growth in the late nineteenth century (Tena, “Bairoch 
Revisited”; Schularick and Solomou, “Tariffs”; Lehmann and O’Rourke, “Structure”) which have shown 
that, if there is a relationship at all, what mattered for long-run growth were tariffs on manufactures, 
especially skill-intensive products. 
8
 In the 1870s, manufactured goods accounted for 40% of the imports of the Northwestern European core 
of the world economy and its European periphery, for 60% of imports in non-European countries, but 
only 20% of imports in the protectionist United States (Yates, Forty Years, Table A.18 and Table A.22, 
pp. 226, 230). We should be aware that trade with bulk foodstuffs in the mid-nineteenth century was still 
largely an intra-European affair (ibid., p. 61)).  
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beverages, were taxed heavily in European countries. Therefore, although by omitting 
agriculture and mining we do not tell the whole story, we do contribute a decisive piece 
of evidence on the evolution of tariffs in the period under study.  We would prefer 
tracing out the full process of the dismantling of mercantilist policies; all the way back 
to the Napoleonic wars.  Unfortunately the very limited availability of comparable 
information regarding tariffs on manufactures before 1846 suggested that it was better 
to be cautious and not to include dispersed evidence into a dataset that was constructed 
to provide the largest possible degree of homogeneity across countries and over time.   
Our new database includes more than 7,500 data points for an extended group of 
23 manufactured products, grouped in 11 categories, in 41 countries, colonies and 
dominions for some selected years during the period 1846 to 1880. The dataset was 
compiled from the collection of Parliamentary Reports on Foreign Duties (British Board 
of Trade) and other Parliamentary papers for several years which capture the changes in 
specific and ad valorem duties on manufactured products around the world. Specific 
duties were converted into ad valorem rates by applying British export prices.  
British export prices were set in an open competitive market, and presumably to 
the standard product variety produced and traded internationally –they are the closest 
possible equivalent to a world market price.  For other countries, comparable average 
prices are either not available (most of the ‘open’, but less developed countries of the 
period) or likely to be influenced by the level of protection that distorted demand for 
product varieties through the tariff structure.9 In general, in view of the limitations of 
                                                          
9
 Cf. the comment by Harley, “Antebellum Tariff,”, esp. p. 800, on Irwin and Temin, “Antebellum Tariff”  
regarding the difference in the average price of cottons exported from Britain and imported into the US. 
Prices in trade statistics outside Britain were often not market, but ‘official’ prices (Lampe, “Bilateral 
Trade Flows,” pp. 97–100) and only recorded for effectively imported product varieties (thereby not 
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disaggregated price data of sufficient quality for all countries in our sample, we focus 
on measuring the levels and changes of tariffs that representative exporters were 
confronted.  We want to leave aside their impact on domestic prices and incentives as 
might be possible in recent fully specified general equilibrium measures of manufacture 
protection.10 Our approach connects closely to the classic comparative works of of the 
Board of Trade, the League of Nations and Heinrich Liepmann.11 
Although our data are mainly drawn from British sources, we believe the figures 
are representative of the trade barriers that confronted the manufactures’ exporters of 
most countries. Since we do not know the relative weight of our 11 industries in world 
commerce, this paper focuses on presenting unweighted averages over commodity 
groups for each country. We ranked the 11 industrial sectors for which we calculate ad 
valorem equivalents according to their relative skill intensity (following Tena), although 
the present work focuses more on the overall picture and only comment briefly on 
trends in dispersion and skill-bias of tariffs.12  
Overall even excluding Britain, there was significant and geographically broad 
trade liberalization in the world before Cobden-Chevalier. Indeed, average tariffs fell 
during the 1850s, although little of it happened in Northwestern Europe. Subsequently, 
Cobden-Chevalier affected a substantial share of world trade and it reinforced previous 
unilateral liberalization trends. Nevertheless, the incidence of treaty-making in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
taking into account items with prohibitions, which were relatively manifold , for example for low quality 
textile varieties in the 1840s and 1850s). 
10
 Anderson and Neary, “Welfare”; Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, “Estimating Trade Restrictiveness.” 
11
 Board of Trade, Import duties and Comparative Incidence;  League of Nations, Tariff Level Indices; 
Liepmann, Tariff Levels. 
12
 Tena, “Bairoch Revisited,” uses 16 different sectors. See note 35 for a more detailed discussion. 
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1860s and early 1870s on manufactures tariffs seems to have been an exclusively 
European phenomenon.  Thus, on the one hand, our view of trade liberalization is more 
optimistic about the period after 1846 than the conventional wisdom offered by Bairoch, 
Irwin and others, who are skeptical about significant liberalization before Cobden-
Chevalier. On the other hand, we show how bilateralism after Cobden-Chevalier served 
to maintain this earlier liberalization dynamic, while countries not taking part in the 
1860s treaty network on average did not further decrease their levels of protection. The 
movement to free-trade in the middle decades of the nineteenth century required a 
sequence of different instruments.  
 
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT WORLD TRADE LIBERALIZATION.  
The best account of nineteenth-century manufacturing tariffs is still that of 
Bairoch.  He shows that after the Napoleonic Wars, most European countries had either 
high levels of protection (Denmark, the UK) or straightforward prohibitions on most 
manufactured goods (Austria, France, Russia, Spain, Sweden).  Outside Europe, Japan 
was still under its Sakoku regime of seclusion and the U. S. had moderately high tariffs.  
The only exceptions to the high protection rule, were the Netherlands (including 
Belgium), Switzerland, and Prussia; there ad valorem equivalents of customs duties 
below 15% prevailed.  In 1875, the United Kingdom had established itself as a 
completely free trader in manufactures, with many other European countries following 
with very low ad valorem equivalents of customs duties (basically the same countries 
with low tariffs in 1820 plus Sweden), or at least moderate levels below 20% (Austria, 
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Denmark, France, Russia and Spain). Outside Europe, Japan became almost a free 
trader, while the U. S. duties increased both during the Civil War and afterwards.13 
What happened between 1820 and 1875? In the United Kingdom the political 
debate between free trade and protection began with the end of hostilities in Europe.  At 
first centered on agricultural commodities, that is, important inputs for labor during the 
countries’ industrialization. The Corn Law of 1815 had prohibited the import of wheat 
and marked the beginning of a conflict between the interests of agriculture and industry 
that marked the following decades not only in Britain but on the Continent as well. 
However, British export manufacturing interests were recognized by the Board of Trade 
as shown by the Reciprocity of Duties Act (1823) that established reciprocal agreements 
with foreign governments for MFN treatment of goods and shipping. Irwin  supports the 
idea that all these efforts failed and frustration and discouragement set the stage for the 
unilateral tariff reforms in the early 1840s that culminated with the repeal of Corn Laws 
in 1846.14  Unilateral conversion to free trade in Britain was not complete because, 
during the 1840s and 1850s (and also afterwards), imports of exotic products like tea, 
tobacco, sugar, coffee, wine and spirits, were still very heavily taxed representing more 
than half of total British tariff revenue. The same was true for France.15  Furthermore, as 
Nye pointed out, Britain maintained high tariffs on French wines and spirits.16 Although 
Britain officially refused the use of discriminatory bargaining practices and immediately 
multilateralised bilateral outcomes of the negotiations that led to the Cobden-Chevalier 
                                                          
13
 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” aptly summarized in Bairoch, Globalization, chs. 2 and 3, in 
particular Table 3.3, p. 40. This table also has Italy as a country with average manufacturing tariffs below 
10% in 1875, lacks comparable data for 1820. 
14
 Irwin, “Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies,” p. 94, following Brown, Board of Trade, p.132. 
15
 Tena, “Assessing the Protectionist Intensity,” p. 107 
16
 Nye, “Myth” and War. 
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treaty, there was still room for the British to offer cuts in a restricted number of dutiable 
goods, like iron, leather articles, silk wares and of course wine, thereby seducing the 
French.17  
 What was the influence of British liberalism on the Continent before Cobden-
Chevalier? Apparently, British liberalization and the significant reduction of transport 
costs following the development of railways, telegraphs and shipping fostered foreign 
trade in the rest of Europe. As pointed out by Bairoch,  “The Continent’s volume of 
exports, which had grown by 1.9% per annum between 1837/39 and 1845/46, increased 
by 6.1% per annum between 1845/47 and 1857/59. For this reason, these years were 
one of the three most favorable periods for export growth in the nineteenth century”.18 
Bairoch and Irwin mention a few examples of trade liberalization during the 1850s: the 
U. S., Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland, as well as Sweden and 
Belgium from 1856/57 onwards. These two authors, however, overlook the fact that 
commerce might have been spurred by the spread of free trade in Continental Europe.19 
Charles P. Kindleberger highlighted long ago that liberalization on the Continent drew 
on the British example and Cobden’s European travels.20 
In a recent provocative paper, Accominotti and Flandreau challenge the validity 
of the conventional chronology of nineteenth-century trade liberalization. They “suggest 
that there was a period of unilateral pan-European trade liberalization, between 1830 
                                                          
17
 Lampe, “Effects,” p. 1015. 
18
 Bairoch, Globalization, p. 22 
19
 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy” and Globalization; Irwin, “Multilateral and Bilateral Trade 
Politicies.” 
20
 Kindleberger, “Rise of Free Trade.” 
10 
 
and 1860.”  In their view, this that process was probably more effective than the new 
instruments of the 1860s, bilateral trade treaties.21 
Outside Europe, the story of almost uniform liberalization between 1815 and 
1875 requires qualification. In Latin America, most former colonies gained 
independence after the Napoleonic Wars. Subsequently they moved away from the 
Mercantilist preferential system and a regional custom union to a more open trade 
policy, in response to both British military and political assistance during their wars of 
independence moved and pro-commerce coalitions by merchants and plantation owners 
involved in tropical export trade.22 Nevertheless, state-building and recurring wars 
required fiscal revenue, which in view of the prevailing low population densities was 
heavily dependent on the taxation of foreign goods arriving into the nation’s ports.23 
Setting tariffs to revenue-optimal levels was, in the words of Victor Bulmer-Thomas, 
“an art, not a science. Furthermore, the existence of numerous tariffs set at different 
rates – typically between 15 percent and 100 percent – on goods competing with 
domestic production gave ample scope for special pleading.”24 Thus, while the 
discriminatory Spanish colonial system was quickly dismantled, subsequent tariff 
reforms left ample scope for local interest groups in industry and handicrafts that could 
exploit the protectionist side of tariff duties originally increased to raise revenue, 
leading to increasing protection of domestic manufacturing in the small, but growing 
markets of Latin American countries. A prominent example is the protection of the 
textile industry in Mexico, where initially revenue-oriented tariffs soon were 
                                                          
21
 Accominotti and Flandreau, “Bilateral Trade Treaties” 
22
  Bairoch, Globalization, pp. 41–42. 
23
 Bértola and Williamson, “Globalization”; Centeno, “Blood.” 
24
 Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, p. 33. 
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accompanied by numerous non-revenue generating import prohibitions.25 While 
comparative evidence on the evolution of tariff rates is scarce, it seems that commercial 
policy was much more domestically driven than in Europe, where liberalization gained 
pace through mid-century bilateralism, while the extent of commercial negotiations 
after the dismantling of the mercantilist system actually slowed down in Latin 
America.26 These observations are actually similar to the evolution of tariffs in the 
United States, where commercial policy after the American War of Independence was 
motivated by both independence from the British colonial system and considerations in 
favor of promoting domestic industrialization in conflict with the interests of export-
oriented plantation owners in the South.  
Many other formally independent countries could not formulate their 
commercial policy independently. Most notably, China, Japan, Turkey and Persia 
practiced more or less voluntarily the “enforced commercial liberalism” of Japan,27 
meaning that they had tariffs not very different from those of free trade countries like 
Britain or the Netherlands. Direct military pressure or defeat led to liberal tariff regimes 
in China due to the Nanking treaty with Britain in 1842 and in Japan following the 
arrival of the famous U.S. expedition led by Commodore Perry in 1853. Others like 
Turkey or Persia, committed themselves via free trade treaties to abolishing monopolies 
and prohibitions, thereby reducing tariff rates to very modest levels.  
In most of the rest of the world direct intervention through colonialism was 
predominant, and policies here also were marked by the dismantling of mercantilist 
                                                          
25
 Salvucci, Textiles; Clemens and Williamson, “Why were Latin American Tariffs.” There is similar 
evidence for Argentina, Colombia and Peru in Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History, p.33. 
26
 Pahre, Politics, pp. 366–67. 
27
 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” p. 155, and Globalization, p. 41. 
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policies. British colonial trade policy in the nineteenth century before 1846/49 was 
marked by a reciprocal preferential system and shipping monopoly between metropolis 
and colonies, discriminating against foreign powers, as evidenced by the Indian 
example: less than 1% of total goods imported into India came from geographical areas 
outside Britain or its other colonies. After 1846 and the repeal of the Navigation Acts, 
something similar to a free trade period began for most colonies, leading to “an open-
door policy […]. But from this date the difference in trade policy between the so called 
Crown colonies and the self governing colonies (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) 
became much more important. Most of these self-governing colonies did not follow the 
British road to liberalism and adopted relatively protectionist trade policies”28 While 
tariffs for most British colonies were set at low rates and remained so during the rest of 
the nineteenth century, the initially very low rated of self-governing colonies – between 
2 and 6 per cent – changed from the mid-1850s in Australia – especially in Victoria –, 
but also in Canada, where there is also evidence of industrial protectionist tariffs being 
levied in those years.29  
This short review of the literature on trade policy marks the agenda for the 
remained of our paper: Different sets of countries exhibit similar trends – a liberalizing 
trend following from the dismantling of mercantilist Old Regime institutions on the one 
hand, but mixed to different degrees with a propensity to protect domestic manufacture 
and to raise revenue on the other – but levels and extent of liberalization nevertheless 
seem to differ substantially between them. Therefore, in the following we group the 
different countries into “clubs” and compare levels and trends in tariff levels. Thereby 
                                                          
28
 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” pp. 110, 137; see also O’Brien, “Intercontinental Trade,” p. 80. 
29
 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” pp.148–49. 
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we establish a more systematic picture than the existing literature, both regarding 
sample size and granularity and comparability of tariff level estimates. 
 
A NEW DATA BASE ON MANUFACTURING TARIFFS AROUND THE WORLD  
Nearly all previous quantitative studies on trade liberalization in the nineteenth 
century have used evidence on grain tariffs, average tariffs, import/GDP ratios or trade 
growth, the work by Bairoch discussed in the previous section being the only major 
exception.  Therefore, they do not offer micro-evidence for exogenous comprehensive 
trade liberalization. Only Lampe developed a database for tariffs on manufactured 
products for seven countries in selected years during the period 1859–1875.30  
To construct a comprehensive data set of tariffs on manufactured goods around 
the world we take advantage of the British government, especially the Board of Trade’s 
interest in trade institutions around the world. It lead to the publication  of large surveys 
on the state and evolution of foreign commercial legislation in Parliamentary Papers 
from the collection compiled inJohn MacGregor’s five-volume Commercial Statistics 
published in 1850 to the famous 1903 Memorandum (with Tabular Statements) on the 
Comparative Incidence of Foreign and Colonial Import Tariffs on the Export Trade of 
the United Kingdom31 These reports provide exhaustive tables on foreign manufacturing 
tariffs by countries and products. The data presented here for individual years between 
1846 and 1880 are mainly based on a report prepared by the Board of Trade under Sir 
Robert Giffen on Rates of duty (foreign and colonial) on British manufactures or 
                                                          
30
 Lampe, “Bilateral Trade Flows” and “Effects”. For the construction of a variable this work was 
extended to 15 European countries in Lampe, “Explaining Nineteenth-Century Bilateralism,”, but the 
tariff rates have not been published separately. 
31
 Board of Trade, Comparative Incidence, part XVI.. 
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produce in a large number of countries and colonies in 1860/61, 1870, 1875, and 
1880.The data were extended back to 1846 using MacGregor, his underlying reports in 
the Parliamentary Papers, several updates of the latter, as well as data compiled by 
contemporary authors, original trade statistics of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, and the Zollverein, and information from Prussian official sources in 
their official commercial periodical Preussisches Handels-Archiv, often compiling 
information from similar publications in other countries.32 
Using these sources allowed us to fully cover the trade regimes for our 11 
commodity groups (see Table 1) for almost all countries in most of the benchmark years 
1846, 1853, 1859, 1863, 1870, 1875 and 1880. Our database also contains many data 
points for years between these benchmark years, but we have not used them at this stage 
to ensure full comparability over time. However, in the future we hope to be able to 
provide complete time series, a task that basically depends on identifying the date (year) 
of the modification of all individual tariff rates covered in the benchmark years.  
The ‘britanocentrism’ of our sources imply that the rates we report are for 
British manufactured products. This is important for 1846, when the preferential system 
for British products in the colonies was still in force. Even then the impact would be 
modest, as preferential tariffs for British colonies were abolished between 1849 and 
1853.  Bilateralism returned after 1860, when treaties following Cobden-Chevalier 
established ‘conventional tariffs’ (based on ‘tariff conventions’, that is, bilateral treaties) 
                                                          
32
 The different reports in the Parliamentary Papers can be identified from the Subject Catalogue by 
Cockton, category: ‘Trade and Commerce. Import and Export Duties. Tariffs.’ Additional sources were 
Hübner, Zolltarife and Zolltarife Zweite Auflage, and Lack, French Treaty. for Latin America, we 
additionally crosschecked our information with De la Cuadra, “Antecedentes,” for Chile, Kuntz Ficker, El 
comercio exterior,  and Cruz Barney, El comercio exterior,  for Mexico and Laurent, Contrabando, pp. 
282–83, 288, 317, for Colombia. 
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that were lower than the ‘autonomous tariffs’ a country’s customs legislation imposed 
on non-treaty partners’ imports. As Lampe has shown fears of discrimination 
accelerated the spread of bilateralism after 1860, thus the preferential treatment under 
the Cobden-Chevalier unconditional most-favored-nation clause was quickly 
generalized.  At most then, a country’s exporter would have had to wait until 1870 to 
experience the lower rates available to British exporters in 1863.  
In most places and years, tariffs were imposed as either ad valorem rates or as 
specific duties even though sometimes they appeared as a combination of both (see 
table 2).33 Specific duties were denominated as monetary values for a certain national 
unit measure of volume, area or weight for which English equivalents were usually 
provided.34 Thus the first challenge was to convert these specific duties into ad valorem 
equivalents comparable across countries and over time. Doing so requires prices. Given 
                                                          
33
 A special, and problematic case, are ad valorem rates that were imposed and reported in the sources we 
use, but where the value could be subject to changing fixed values stipulated by local or national 
authorities, so they were not necessarily levied on the actual value of a product. This meant that rates in 
practice were more specific than ad valorem, the ad valorem rate in the tariff scheme being only a rough 
orientation. This system can be found in some Latin American and other peripheral countries and was 
practiced because authorities did not believe in the invoice values reflecting the actual price of the 
product. MacGregor, Commercial Statistics, (or the consuls whose reports he transmits) repeatedly 
highlights arbitrary valuation procedures in backward countries; see, for example, about Greece, ibid., 
vol. II, p. 190, and about Morocco, ibid., p. 288: “The import duties are sometimes arbitrarily raised, and 
they are often corruptly levied; but 10 per cent on the value is the general rate of import duty: the value is, 
however, often underrated, by means of bribes or otherwise.”)  
34
 The main exception are textile duties specified for yards (or varas) of cloth instead of units of weight. 
Here, we follow, Board of Trade, Comparative Incidence, p.170: “After careful inquiry, an average 
weight of 5 yards to the lb. has been assumed. In the same way an ‘average count’ of 40 has been 
assumed for cotton yarns. In the case of woollen and worsted piece goods average weights have been 
estimated varying from 18 ozs. to the yard for heavy broad woollen piece goods and worsted coatings, to 
5 ozs. to the yard for mixed worsted stuffs. Linen piece goods have been taken as 35 lbs. to the 100 
yards.” 
At different points in time, Victoria and New Zealand had duties (or ‘registration fees’) per cubic foot on 
several items. We have decided to use British standard transport/stowage conversion rates for light goods 
of 50 cubic feet to the ton to convert this volume measure into weight (Stevens, On the Stowage,  pp. 31, 
303, etc.).   
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the number of products involved, we could not match specific duties with prices 
perfectly. First, we organized the data into 11 sectors following recent work by Tena.35 
These sectors represent the bulk of manufactures traded and span products of different 
skill intensities. Secondly, we collected the quantities and values of exports from the 
British trade statistics for the corresponding products or groups from 1846 to 1880. 
Thirdly, we computed implicit prices (unit values) for all these products (23 in total) 
and averaged them out within each sector. Fourthly, we extrapolated some price series 
back to 1846 using Augustus Sauerbeck’s series.36 Finally, we divided all specific 
duties by their respective prices or, whenever missing, by their respective average sector 
prices.37  
We acknowledge that by applying British export prices, we bias the ad valorem 
tariffs upwards. Indeed, using British prices assumes that the F.O.B/C.I.F. price 
differential was low for most manufactured products according to recent estimates, 
which is justified by their above average value-to-weight ratio.38 In addition, it is far 
                                                          
35
 Actually, comparing to Tena, “Bairoch Revisited,” five groups were excluded due to lack of data: ships, 
machinery & hardware, chemicals, apparel, and jute and hemp. For chemicals (bleaching powder and 
alkali) and hemp we have prices, but dealing with the tariff rates was problematic. Both problems reflect 
the fact that most of the products included in these categories were relatively unimportant in international 
trade before 1880. 
36
 Sauerbeck, “Prices.” 
37
 See online appendix A.1 for a complete dataset on prices. 
38
 Federico and Tena have estimated for their ongoing research project on The Growth of World Trade 
1800-1940 cif-fob conversion ratios for manufactures (including insurance) between 1848 and1880 for 12 
different shipping routes in four different continents. The average cif-fob differential for the whole period 
in the world would be 4.2% (with a minimum of 3.2% and a maximum of 6.9% during the period). The 
average differentials for regional areas would be 4.2, 3.9, 4.3 and 4.3 per cent for Europe, Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, respectively.  The estimates are based on Angier’s general UK manufacture outbound 
freights in Fifty Years’ Freights. This series indicates a stable conversion ratio of 1.5 between freight 
rates for manufactures and those for coal for different international destinations. Coal freight rates have 
been transformed into freight rate series for manufactures from 1848-1880 by dividing them by the UK 
export cotton yarn unit value and adding insurance, assumed to be 2% of value in 1900 and moved 
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from clear whether ad valorem tariffs were always levied on C.I.F. prices, or whether 
F.O.B. invoice values were sometimes used. As noted in the introduction, this implies 
that our dataset is a better measure of barriers for exporters than of protection for 
import-competing domestic producers. 
 
Table 1: Construction of Price Series 
Sectors with complete price series 1846-1880 
Woolen Manufactures: Woolen piece light all wool; Worsted stuffs all wool; 
Woolen clothing - flannels 
Linen Manufactures: Linen Piece goods 
Cotton Manufacture: Cotton piece bleached; Cotton piece printed 
Woolen Yarns: Worsted yarn 
Linen Yarns: Linen yarns unbleached 
Cotton Yarns: Cotton thread for sewing 
Iron & Steel: Pig Iron; Steel bars, angles, shapes 
Sector with incomplete price series Data available 
Paper Paper hangings; paper for writing  1854-1880 
Leather Calf Skins 1854-1880 
 Boots and shoes of leather 1862-1880 
Copper Copper ingots, Cakes, Slabs 1854-1880 
Silk Manufactures Silk, thrown;  1846-1870 
 Silk manufactures 1846-1860 
Source: see text 
Note: the missing data are extrapolated using a variety of Sauerbeck’s  indices. The 
paper series and leather series are extrapolated back using the Grand Total Indexin 
Sauerbeck, “Prices”, app. D, p. 648; For Copper, the “Copper” series, ibid., app. C, no. 
22, p. 645 was used.  Silk, thrown was extrapolated to forward to 1880 using the “Silk” 
series, ibid., app. C., no. 34, p. 646. Silk manufactures were extrapolated based on our 
series of “Silk, thrown”. 
 
Our main argument for the use of British export prices is that they offer better 
relative price estimates than the more or less arbitrarily fixed import values reported in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
backwards with their respective shipping freight rates by route (for the insurance of British cotton exports 
in the 1850s see Llorca-Jaña, “To be Waterproof.”.  
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many official statistics of less developed countries. As we noted earlier, they are also 
less distorted by trade barriers than the import prices of countries that applied tariff 
barriers against British manufactures or prohibited the importation of a significant 
number of product varieties, as was the case for example in France before 1860.39 
Finally, British export prices do correspond best to the product variety/quality for which 
we have collected specific tariffs, so that we see no viable alternative to using them if 
the dataset is expected to be consistent over time and comparable between countries. 
Additionally, some countries, namely Spain and Mexico, imposed prohibitions 
on entire commodity groups.40  Without assigning them some tariff level we could not 
include them in our estimates of average protection, leading to downward-biased 
estimates of their levels of protection.  However, there is evidence that these 
prohibitions, as well as very high “super tariffs”, induced smuggling in many countries 
such as Colombia, Mexico and Spain, thereby partially neutralizing their formal 
purpose.41  Since our main objective is to measure exogenous changes in commercial 
policy, not endogenous changes in the effects of protectionism, we assigned a rate of 
twice the specific or ad valorem rate for the first period when imports were allowed, for 
all prohibitions. In other words, we take abolishing a prohibition to be equivalent to 
halving a prohibitively high tariff. This approach was inspired by a circular of the 
                                                          
39
 See Harley, “Antebellum Tariff,” on U.S. cottons and Lampe, “Explaining Nineteenth-Century 
Bilateralism,.” App. 2, on prohibitions. 
40
 Prohibitions (substituted with twice the specific or ad valorem rate in the first period after repeal). The 
rate given below is the one included for our calculations in current prices Mexico:  Leather: 1846: 283%, 
1853: 265%; Copper: 1846: 145%, 1853: 145%; Cotton Yarns: 1846: 213%, 1853: 220% Spain: Leather: 
1846: 116%; Cottons: 1846: 200%; Cotton Yarns: 1846: 224%. 
41
 During the years 1846-1860 around 50% of total imports into Spain from Britain were smuggled from 
Gibraltar and Portugal (see the estimate made by Prados de la Escosura, “El comercio hispano-británico,” 
p.151).  It is difficult to evaluate the effects of prohibitions (with high smuggling repression) and 
extremely high tariffs (with low smuggling repression) on changes of real protection during these years. 
For the case of Colombia see Laurent, Contrabando.  
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Spanish customs authorities (5 July 1864), which decided –that while the import of 
knitted cottons was prohibited, when they were declared bona fide for importation, they 
could be imported paying twice the duty for the corresponding woven cottons.42  
Another problem stems from the extremely high tariff rate calculations which 
arise from prohibitions of imports of lower value items in a commodity group (such as 
low count cotton yarn in France before Cobden-Chevalier and many items in Russia 
before 1859), while tariffs apply to high value varieties but are divided by the relatively 
low unit value of British exports.43  If our calculated duties were higher than 300%, we 
have applied a cap and set the value to 300 to avoid distortions. In all, this involved 
coding of equivalents of nine prohibition data points and application of the 300% cap in 
nine cases, all heavily clustered in 1846 and 1853 and in few countries.44From the rates 
obtained for the 11 individual groups we have calculated unweighted average tariffs for 
each county by period, following the tradition of the Board of Trade itself, the League 
of Nations and Liepmann.45  
                                                          
42
 Preussisches Handels-Archiv 1864/II, p. 189: “Verzollung gewirkter baumwollener Waaren in Spanien 
(Mon. univ. Nr. 224).”  We have tried to solve the problem in other ways, for example,using price 
differentials or examining British exports to countries with very high tariffs in the corresponding years. 
Unfortunately, trustworthy data for international price comparisons between peripheral countries and 
trade with them in the first periods of our dataset (1846/1853) is too scarce. This also renders more 
systematic approaches impossible, for example, following Beghin and Yue, “Tariff Equivalent,” or Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga, “Estimating Trade Restrictiveness,” not to speak of calibrated general equilibrium 
models. 
43
 Ad valorem equivalents higher than 300% in current prices where the 300% cap was applied: France: 
Cotton Yarns: 1846: 337%, 1853: 349%, 1859: 331% ; Portugal (1846): Linen Yarns 482% ; Russia 
(1846): Iron and Steel 314%, Leather 371%, Linens 1467%, Cottons 486%  Russia (1853): Linens 368%. 
44
 We abstained from trying to estimate the ad valorem equivalent of the Japanese seclusion policy before 
1859, and also did not calculate equivalents of port use restrictions prior to 1867/8. 
45
 Board of Trade, Import duties and Comparative Incidence; League of Nations, Tariff Level Indices; 
Liepmann, Tariff Levels. We have also calculated a weighted average across commodities based on 
British export shares, as reported in online appendix A.3. Although these British export shares are not 
necessarily representative of the world’s or each country’s demand, they can still be interpreted as a 
measure of “trade resistance” to British industrial exports. 
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The database covers a wide geographical area, encompassing most regions of the world. 
Its 41 countries and dependencies were organized into six groups: ‘Rich Europeans’, 
‘Poor Europeans’, ‘Independent New Settlers’ (that is, United States), ‘Semi-
independent New Settlers’ (Australia, Canada and New Zealand), ‘Independent Poor’ 
(Latin American countries), and ‘Dependent Poor’ (including colonies and independent, 
but compulsory liberalized countries like China, Japan, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Zanzibar).  This classification is arbitrary but it follows an explicit criterion: we define 
as poor those countries with a 1870 GDP per capita less than half the U.K’s (the richest 
country in the world), according to Angus Maddison.46 See below how countries were 
allocated into these six groups. In the following section, we present the unweighted 
average of the average tariffs of each group. Table 2 shows for which countries we have 
full data and in which of our seven benchmark years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 Maddison, The World Economy. 
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Table 2: Data Availability 
"Club" Country Years Missing Tariffs were 
Rich Europe 
(EuroCore) 
 
 
 
Belgium Specific 
Denmark Specific 
France Specific 
Netherlands Both 
Switzerland Specific 
Zollverein (Germany) Specific 
Independent Settler USA both/mix 
Poor Europe 
(EuroPeriphery) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria-Hungary Specific 
Greece mostly specific 
Italy 1846, 1853, 1859 Specific 
Moldovia-Wallachia/ 
Romania 
ad valorem, 1880: 
specific 
Norway Specific 
Portugal Specific 
Roman (Papal) States 1875, 1880 Specific 
Russia Specific 
Sardinia 1863, 1870, 1875, 1880 Specific 
Spain Specific 
Sweden Specific 
Semi Independent 
Settlers 
 
Australia (Victoria) None but 1846=NSW ad valorem 
Canada ad valorem 
New Zealand specific  
Poor Independent 
 
 
 
 
Argentina (Buenos Aires) 1846 ad valorem 
Brazil mainly ad valorem 
Chile 
1846 specific, then ad 
valorem 
Colombia (New Granada) Specific 
Mexico Specific 
Peru 
ad valorem, 1880: 
specific 
Uruguay ad valorem 
Venezuela Specific 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poor dependent 
(including. 
compulsorily 
liberalized 
independent) 
 
China 
specific (based on ad 
valorem) 
Cuba mainly ad valorem 
Dutch East Indies (Java) 1853 ad valorem 
Hong Kong no tariffs 
India ad valorem 
Jamaica 1846 ad valorem 
Japan 1846, 1853 ad valorem 
Morocco mainly ad valorem 
South Africa ad valorem 
Tunisia 1846, 1853 ad valorem 
Turkey (including Egypt) both 
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Zanzibar ad valorem 
 
Source: see text / own work.  
Note: Moldavia and Wallachia had identical tariff rates before the united as 
Romania; Sardinia refers to all of Piedmont-Sardinia. The last column informs whether 
tariffs were levied in ad valorem (percentage of value) or specific (rate per unit of 
weight or volume) form. ‘Both’ means that some commodities were rated ad valorem, 
others not. ‘Mix’ means that at least some commodities were subject to tariffs that had a 
specific and an ad valorem component.  
 
 
When aggregating all countries into a world average, we have opted for the calculation 
of a weighted average, using shares of world trade or population in 1879. Each 
country’s share in world imports in 1879 according to Giffen.47 This is the most detailed 
estimation of the geographical division of world trade (including colonies) for the 
period under study, and a better alternative to the conventional contemporary GDP 
estimations, at least in the case of poor countries. Each country’s share of world 
population was taken from Maddison.48  All in all, our database permits an evaluation of 
tariff protection around the world from 1846 to 1880, thereby highlighting the possible 
effects of Cobden-Chevalier, or their absence.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 Giffen, “Use,” pp. 255–58. 
48
 Maddison, The World Economy. 
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HOW MUCH TRADE LIBERALIZATION HAPPENED IN THE WORLD? 
In the following, we focus on comparing country club and world trends in tariff 
levels and changes between 1846 and 1880, focusing on the periods before and after the 
Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860. Although national episodes are extremely interesting, 
a systematic comparison is outside the scope of the present paper.49  
Figure 1 indicates, first of all, the surprising variety in tariff levels and 
movements between country clubs and over time. It shows that Cobden-Chevalier was 
an exclusively European phenomenon. On the continent, the average tariff moved very 
little during the late 1840s and 1850s and then fell from 23.3% in 1859 to 10.6% in 
1863 and 9.3% in 1870. We can also see that, at least as early as 1853, a trend away 
from high tariff barriers was underway.  Moreover this trend was more pronounced in 
the poorer countries of the European periphery and Latin America than in the European 
core of the world economy. This trend towards lower trade barriers was also shared by 
the United States with the relatively liberal 1857 tariff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
 The national average rates per country can be found in online appendix A.2. 
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Figure 1: Unweighted average tariffs computed with current and constant 1860 
prices, 1846-1880 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880
Unweighted Average Tariff - Rich Europe
Unweighted Average - Rich Europe - current prices
Unweighted Average  - Rich Europe - 1860 prices
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880
Unweighted Average Tariff  - United States
Unweighted Average  - New Settlers (US) - current prices
Unweighted Average  - United States - 1860 prices
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880
Unweighted Average Tariff  -
European Periphery
Unweighted Average - EuroPeriphery - current prices
Unweighted Average  - European periphery - 1860 prices
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880
Unweighted Average Tariff  - Poor independent
Unweighted Average  - Poor Independent - current prices
Unweighted Average  - Poor independent - 1860 prices
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880
Unweighted Average Tariff -
Dependent and compulsorily liberalized
Unweighted Average  - Poor dependent (incl. comp. lib.)  - current prices
Unweighted Average  - Poor dependent (incl. comp. lib.) - 1860 prices
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880
Unweighted Average Tariff -
Rich semi-independent
Unweighted Average - Rich semi-independent - current prices
Unweighted Average  - Rich semi-independent - 1860 prices
Sources: see online appendix A.2 and A.3 for underlying data. 60% set as maximum for display 
purposes. Unweighted average over all commodities and countries. 
 
The impact of Cobden-Chevalier in the European periphery was, however, much 
smaller and limited to some countries (Scandinavia, Austria, the Italian States, and, 
later, Spain).  Some of these did not liberalize so much through treaties, but by making 
unilateral reforms (especially Spain), while Portugal, Russia and Greece followed the 
tide only reluctantly or not at all. Also, while the European periphery “liberalized” 
before and after 1860, actual duties remained on average much higher (in 1859, 29.5% 
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in 1870, 21.8%) than in the European core.  In fact tariffs on the southern periphery 
after 1860 are similar to those of the European core in 1859.  In contrast, Scandinavian 
countries changed from a more peripheral to a more core pattern over time and by 1870, 
their average tariffs had dropped all the way to 7.6% for Norway and 10.3% for Sweden 
in 1870.50 Italy (8.7%) also followed a similar pattern.51 After 1870, Europeans went in 
reverse. As a result of national industrialization policies, trade protection increased.  
This time, however, the process was more severe in the poorer periphery than in the 
richer core. There the average level only increased to 11% in 1880.  
New Settlers (the U.S. as well as the increasingly self-governing British colonies, 
although to a much lesser degree) and Latin American countries (Poor Independent) 
actually show an increase in tariff levels after 1860, clearly indicating that European 
liberalization, including Cobden-Chevalier were of little importance to them. In Latin 
America, average tariffs fell from 50.5% in 1846 to about 30.8% in 1863, only to 
increase again, to 41.1% in 1880. These countries were more susceptible to altering 
their duties to meet domestic fiscal imperatives.  After years of political instability, 
central governments could only turn to foreign trade support their growing fiscal needs. 
Tariff levels followed political cycles.  Finally, the colonies, dominions and formally 
independent states subject to what Bairoch named ‘compulsory economic liberalism’ 
confirm the conventional wisdom. Their average rates were below 10% in all periods 
for almost all countries and the impact of self-governance in Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada was small.  The Dutch East Indies did have a 20% average in 1846, and 
Cuba, a colony of high-tariff Spain, was the only one where rates rose from 26% in 
                                                          
50
 On Scandinavia and Cobden-Chevalier see Lampe and Sharp, “Something Rational.” 
51
 Federico and Tena, “Was Italy?” 
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1846 to 70% in 1880.  In fact Cuba behaves quite like the newly- independent former 
Spanish colonies.52   
Since most nineteenth-century tariffs were specific duties denominated in 
national currencies, it is important to investigate whether tariff protection changed over 
time because of conscious decisions of governments to modify these specific duties or 
whether this process was more the result of constant duties and changing prices. When 
we recomputed the average tariffs using prices fixed at 1860 – see Figure 1 – a few 
changes appear. To be sure, the levels change slightly and any decline in protection in 
the European core before 1860 and in the poor periphery between 1859 and 1863 
disappears.  Thus it is likely that the increase in textile prices due to the American Civil 
War helped to moderate protection in those years even if governmental policies, rather 
than movements in prices, shaped the picture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52
 Morocco shows averages of 13 to 18% before 1860, which are caused by a specific rate on iron that 
leads to an ad valorem equivalent that is much higher than the otherwise applied 10%rule. 
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Figure 2 
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Sources: Cotton piece bleached and printed from online appendix A.1; ’Sandberg total cotton 
cloth’ and ’Sandberg USA’, that is, average prices for British exports to the U. S.,  from 
Sandberg, Lancashire,  Appendix. D.   
 
One area where prices mattered was textiles, especially cottons. Figure 2 shows 
the comparative evolution of the prices for bleached and unbleached and for dyed and 
printed piece goods of cotton manufacture price in our data base versus the well-known 
cotton cloth prices collected by Lars G. Sandberg (that should be an average of bleached 
and unbleached and printed and dyed cotton piece goods also from British export 
statistics).53 Sandberg’s price in 1846 and 1853 is almost identical to our cotton cloth 
average prices, but in 1859 it is closer to our price for bleached and unbleached cottons, 
again very similar to both in 1863, and once again closer to the latter series in 1870, 
                                                          
53
 Sandberg, Lancashire, App. D, pp. 252–62, presents what he calls British cotton textile exports by 
countries in values and quantities. This cloth price rate is measured in pounds sterling per yard of the ratio 
sum of USA, France, Brazil and India respective quantities and values.  
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1875 and 1880.54  As expected, the movements of the indices are very similar also from 
1854 onwards: both peak in 1864 and both fall from 1864 to 1870 at same time as 
cotton tariffs first fall and then rise (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Average tariffs on cotton manufactures (piece goods), unweighted. 
Current vs. fixed (1860) prices, 1846-1880 
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On the one hand, as expected, in the 1850s stable cotton prices could not provide 
the impetus for the liberalization of the poor European periphery and Latin America.  
                                                          
54
 Following Harley, “Antebellum Tariff,” we have included Sandberg’s prices for cotton cloth exports to 
the US in Figure 3 to show that we are aware of the cotton import substitution and demand bias created 
by the US ad valorem cotton tariff from 1846 onwards (and by the minimum valuation before the Walker 
tariff of 1846). The price differential increase between British cotton exports to US and to the rest of the 
world widens drastically after the North American Civil War.  
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Moreover, in this period reductions in cotton tariffs, that is, changes in specific rates 
stipulated by law, were exceedingly rare in the European core before Cobden-Chevalier. 
That is what the ‘fixed price’ column of column Figure 4 shows.  This inertia fits very 
well with the conventional accounts of commercial policy history for Europe before the 
outbreak of Cobden-Chevalier bilateralism.55 
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows how the exceptional rise in raw cotton prices 
following the American Civil War magnified the effect of decreasing specific tariff 
barriers.  This was especially true in Europe where the Cobden-Chevalier network 
expanded rapidly. The decrease in ad valorem equivalents of tariffs on cotton textiles 
until 1863 was clearly more due to an increase in the denominator (prices) than to a fall 
of specific tariffs in the numerator. For other textiles, a similar, though smaller, effect 
also appears. The influence of prices on ad valorem protection is also important in the 
second half of the 1860s when the second round of bilateral tariff agreements was 
probably compensated by the large reduction in prices.56  
The foregoing conclusions are subject to one caveat.  Because we use specific 
duties in pounds sterling which do not provide data in national currencies for all years 
and countries, we cannot disentangle the effect of changes in the exchange rate as a 
source of protection or liberalization during this period. We observe that the exchange 
rates used in the British reports are constant rates which seemed to be based on the mint 
parity between currencies. This implies that the depreciation of currencies against the 
mint parity might have lowered the tariff level faced by exporters to that country if the 
stipulated duties were specific.  We have not systematically corrected this potential bias 
                                                          
55
 See, among others, O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization,  p. 38, and Bairoch, Globalization, p. 22. 
56
 Our data base prices (see online appendix A.1) show for linens and woolens and worsteds a more 
moderate price increase in the early 1860s than for cottons, but both were also affected by the impact of 
the American Civil War.  
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for two reasons: the first is that accessible exchange rates (as collected by Markus 
Denzel57) are for ‘cashless payments,’ while customs duties especially in peripheral 
countries (for example, Mexico, Venezuela, China)58 had to be paid in cash, that is with 
precious metal coins.59 The most prominent example is the paper currency issued during 
the U.S. Civil War (greenback dollar). The Legal Tender Act of 1862 defined it as legal 
tender for payment “of all taxes, internal duties, excises, debts […], except duties on 
imports”, which still had to be paid in cash (specie dollars). The second reason is that in 
most countries where duties were specific, essentially those in Europe (see Table 2), 
exchange rates were essentially stable. The exceptions to these rules are, to our 
knowledge, Russia and China. In Russia, after 1877, customs duties had acquitted in 
gold, (presumably before that they could be paid in paper rubles).60  For China, as the 
world gold-silver price started to rise substantially after 1873 (when German and France 
both went on to gold), the Shanghai tael, the silver-based currency used in the Maritime 
Customs Office, slowly lost value relative to the pound sterling.61 This might also apply 
                                                          
57
 Denzel, Handbook. 
58
  
59
 Hübner, Zolltarife Zweite Auflage, gives an overview for most countries in the world about the 
modalities of customs duty payments in the mid-1860s. While cash payments were very common, some 
cases are more complicated, for example, in Colombia duties had to be paid in a mix of internal and 
foreign debt certificates and gold and silver coins; see ibid., p.213.  
60
 Bairoch, “European Trade Policy,” p. 62. If we assume that this depreciation followed the sterling-ruble 
exchange rate quoted in Denzel, Handbook, pp. 370-71, and started with the Crimean War, then the rates 
in online appendix A.2 should be 44.5% instead of 48.8% (1859), 46.3% instead of 54.4% (1863), 37.7% 
instead of 48.9% (1870) and 43.3% instead of 50.6% (1875), while for 1880 we would assume the rate to 
be “at par”. These results are in line with Bairoch’s observation that charging in gold increased tariff 
levels by about 32% in 1877, when the credit ruble was more devalued than in 1875.  
61
 For the commercial gold-silver-rate in London see Flandreau, Glitter,  pp.6, 243. For the official 
Shanghai tael to pound sterling exchange rates see Denzel, Handbook, pp. 509–10. If we account for 
depreciation since 1873, the Chinese tariff rates would be slightly lower than indicated in Table A.2: 
5.3% instead of 5.7% in 1875 and 5.6% instead of 6.4% in 1880. For an account of the spread of the gold 
standard see López-Córdova and Meissner, “Exchange-Rate Regimes.” 
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to other silver-based currencies such as the Mexican peso, for which, however, we lack 
valid specie-exchange rate information. Overall, the effect of changing exchange rates 
during the 1850s and 1860s is small, and after 1870 the spread of the gold standard, is 
important but it would not seriously affect the patterns we have found. 
Returning to Figure 1, it is clear that Cobden-Chevalier was an exclusively 
European phenomenon. Tariff protection decreased in both the core of rich countries 
and with some delay in at least some parts of the European periphery. In the rest of the 
world, trade protection evolved in a different way. In the United States, tariff barriers 
actually increased from the late 1850s and early 1860s to the 1870s. For Latin America, 
liberalization was a pre-Cobden-Chevalier experience and return to protection started as 
early as the 1860s.  Since Europe was at the center of the nineteenth-century economy, 
we need to ask what the effect of European liberalization was on world tariffs.  
Looking at Figure 4 we see that the movements of the ‘world tariff’ average are 
very similar whether we weigh countries by their share of world population or of world 
trade.  Before 1860, the ‘world tariff’ declined from 49 to 31% if weighted by trade 
shares, and from 31 to just 17% if weighted by population. The differences reflect the 
fact that large parts of the world population lived under regimes of ‘compulsory 
liberalism’, implying that both the ‘trade per person’ and the tariff levels of these 
territories were below those of richer countries. This was particularly true for China and 
India. By 1870, world levels fell to 21% if weighted by trade and 15% if weighted by 
population.  Then from 1870 to 1880 we see a slight increase by 2 to 4 percentage 
points. This indicates that there might have been ‘globalization backlash’ for 
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manufactures after 1870, but in comparison to the (European) reactions to the ‘grain 
invasion’ it seems to have been rather mild.62   
 
Figure 4: World tariff average on manufacturing trade, 1846-1880 
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Sources: see online appendix for underlying data. Weights are shares in total trade and 
population by countries respectively, in 1879. The rates for each country are the unweighted 
rates. 
 
So, did Cobden-Chevalier matter? If we compare the ‘members’ of the Cobden-
Chevalier network – defined as those who concluded at least three treaties with 
unconditional most-favored nation clause before 1870 -  to ‘non.members’  among the 
independent countries in our sample, the following picture emerges (Table 3): 63:  
                                                          
62
 See O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization, pp. 97–105) and the works cited there for a 
comprehensive discussion of ‘globalization backlash’ in agriculture.  
63
  We used the list of contracts by countries in the working paper version of Lampe, “Effects,” appendix 
1, and count as ‘members’: Belgium, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Zollverein (Germany), Austria-
Hungary, Italia (Sardinia), Norway, Roman (Papal) States, Spain, and Sweden; while Denmark, USA, 
33 
 
 
Table 3: The Cobden-Chevalier Network and the Evolution of Tariff Rates 
Tariff change  
1846-59 
Tariff level 
1859 
Tariff change 
1859-70 
Tariff level 
1870 
Tariff change 
1870-80 
Cobden-Chevalier -29% 36% -48% 13% 17% 
Non Cobden-Chevalier -12% 40% 17% 32% 31% 
 
Source: online appendix A.2; see text. 
Note: Changes are changes in percent, not percent points. 
 
Cobden-Chevalier mattered, but liberalization was underway in the participating 
countries at least since 1846. The countries taking part in Cobden-Chevalier liberalized 
more before and during the 1860s than the other independent countries in our sample.64 
Indeed, between 1859 and 1870 the average liberalization was larger than that achieved 
in each of the eight GATT rounds between 1947 and 1994.65 , At the same time, non-
treaty countries moved (on average)  towards more protection, increasing tariffs by 17% 
and 31% in 1859-70 and 1870-80, respectively. exceeding This suggests that there were 
no simultaneous “two ways” to liberalization, and that the movement to free trade 
developed step by step employing different instruments. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Greece, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela are ‘non-members’ In 1846-59 we do not include Switzerland under Cobden-Chevalier since 
its calculatory increase by 658% (from 0.4 to 2.9%) was the outcome of a complete change in the customs 
system between 1849 and 1851 that did not actually involve an increase in protection, but a unification of 
the customs territory; Polli-Schönborn, “Zölle.” 
64
 A look at Figure 1 and the underlying data reveals that liberalization was probably faster on average 
among the European periphery countries during the 1850s, while during the 1860s the cuts in tariff rates 
were largest in some of the richer countries. 
65
 Jackson, World Trading System, p. 74, gives the average tariff cut on non-primary goods in industrial 
countries as 34% to 38% between the Geneva and the Uruguay round. 
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STRUCTURE AND DISPERSION OF TARIFFS  
As can be observed from Figures 1, and 3, tariffs for cotton manufactures were 
much higher than the simple average over all commodity groups. There are several 
possible reasons for this.  Most importantly, countries (outside the British Empire) 
might have reacted to British comparative advantage in textile production by 
defensively protecting their industries.  If so they would have biased their tariff 
structure against those products that the British were most desirous of selling.66 They 
might also have been disproportionately protecting either those sectors where value 
added and spillover potential were highest (a ‘positive skill-bias’ according to Nathan 
Nunn and Daniel Trefler)67 or domestic lobby groups or “national labor” were best 
organized, potentially causing a “negative skill bias”. 
We can use the detailed information at industry level in our dataset to shed some 
preliminary light onto these questions. First, we can look at the level of dispersion in 
tariff rates, that is, their variances across commodity groups to see which countries had 
more diversified tariff schemes, potentially reflecting more active commercial policy. 
Let us examine the coefficient of variation, which corrects for the fact that countries 
with high tariffs are also likely to have high variances across products.  All points in 
time, European countries, rich and poor(er), seemed to pursue a much more active trade 
policy in the sense that the coefficient of variation of their rates is much higher than that 
of the rest in our sample, with Latin American countries and the rich settler colonies 
temporarily approaching European levels in the middle of our period, but then 
decreasing again. This pattern is reflected in the fact that outside Europe relatively 
                                                          
66
 This can be seen from a comparison of the British-export weighted rates in online appendix A.3 with 
the unweighted averages in online appendix A.2: The weighted rates are higher for almost all independent 
countries. 
67
 Nunn and Trefler, “Structure.” 
35 
 
uniform ad valorem rates across commodity groups were much more common than in 
Europe, where detailed schemes of specific duties prevailed. The second step is to look 
at the level and evolution of the ‘skill bias’ over time. For the present purpose we have 
measured skill bias as the ratio of the average of ‘high-skill industries’ to ‘low-skill 
industries’, following Tena.68 A value above 1 for this indicator means that that high-
skill industries were more protected than low-skill industries, which ceteris paribus 
hints at a ‘positive skill bias’ in the tariff structure. Figure 5 shows that the skill bias in 
current prices was consistently above 1 over the whole period in the rich European core, 
while it was mostly below one in thepoorer European periphery, especially after 1863, 
when a clear bias in favor of low-skill manufactures becomes visible.  For the period 
1859-70 we observe divergent patterns between skill bias measured in current and 
constant prices, indicating contrary movements in relative prices and relative nominal 
protection levels. From 1859 to 1863, in current prices, tariffs for low-skill sectors fell 
faster than those for high-skill sectors both in the core and in the periphery, even though 
pure commercial policy did actually lower duties in constant prices faster for high- than 
for low-skilled sectors. Between 1863 and 1870 we see that in both ‘clubs’ commercial 
policy became more inclined towards low-skill sectors, a process that was reversed to a 
certain degree in the Rich European countries after 1870, presumably by slightly 
increasing tariffs for high-skill industries.  In sum, Cobden-Chevalier, despite lowering 
overall tariff levels, did little to change the tariff structure in favor of skill-intensive 
manufactures.  
 
 
                                                          
68
 Tena, “Bairoch Revisited,”defines paper, silk manufactures (incl, thread), iron and steel and leather as 
industries with high skill intensity, while the corresponding low-skill sectors are woolen, linen and cotton 
yarns and the manufactures (cloth) made thereof. 
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Figure 5: Tariff skill bias 
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Note: Skill bias calculated as ratio of tariff average for manufactures with high skill intensity to 
tariff average for manufactures with low skill intensity (see text). 
 
For the other clubs, the evidence is mixed and inconclusive. After the Civil War 
in the U.S. the tariff structure also became more inclined towards low-skill industries: 
the average pre-war ratio was 1.05 and it fell to an average of 0.84 after 1863. Latin 
American countries showed a pattern that consistently favored low-skill over high-skill 
sectors (they average 0.86). The Rich semi-independent group (Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand) consistently increased their inclination towards more skill-intensive 
activities (from 0.77 in 1853 to 1.22 in 1875). The group of the dependent poor shows 
the opposite trend (moving from 1.3 before 1860 to 0.97 after 1870).  This result, 
however, is driven mainly by India and Morocco;  most countries had ratios close to one 
over the whole period thanks to their ‘flat rate’ ad valorem tariffs. 
However, the whole complex of skill-bias requires much more detailed 
investigation, since countries at different levels of development might rationally choose 
a tariff structure that first favors labor-intensive, low-skill manufacturing over 
agriculture (and impose fiscal tariffs on higher-skill products), medium-skill capital 
intensive manufactures over low-skill sectors or strategic and skill-intensive sectors not 
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covered here (for example, machinery, arms, locomotives or boats) over industries 
producing the commodities we define as skill intensive.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This article offers a new wider perspective on the evolution of worldwide tariff 
levels on manufactures from 1846 to 1880. Previous attempts to measure tariff rates and 
their changes had been limited to some European countries, to protection on agriculture 
or based on the ‘average tariff’ measure which is strongly biased, especially in Europe, 
by changes in fiscal tariffs on product of tropical agriculture, alcoholic beverages and 
the like. Although the data and analysis presented in the present article will be extended 
in the future to allow for solid econometric analysis into causal relations between 
liberalization (especially of manufactured goods) and trade expansion in different 
regions of the world as well as explanatory models of the ‘demand side’ of 
liberalization, that is the political economy of tariffs, we wish to highlight a number of 
important findings: 
Our results show that world trade was increasingly liberalized since at least 
1846. This makes our view on liberalization is therefore more optimistic than the 
conventional wisdom offered by Bairoch, Irwin and others who are skeptical about 
significant liberalization outside Britain before the wave of bilateral treaties of the 
1860s. We find that most independent countries in the world liberalized during the late 
1840s and the 1850s, and that liberalization on a world level continued until at least 
1870. In the second phase of world tariff liberalization after 1860, liberalization via 
Cobden-Chevalier bilateralism was important for the reduction of manufactures tariffs 
in the world, not least because the share of the ‘member’ countries of the network in 
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world trade (not including the UK) was about 60% (in 1879). Furthermore, tariff rates 
remained low in most of the colonies and territories under European influence. In 
contrast, those independent countries not taking part in this wave of treaties on average 
increased their levels of protection. However, since their share in world trade was rather 
small (about 26%, most of it by the U.S. and Russia), their impact on a world scale was 
relatively small. The observed correlation in the 1860s between absence of bilateral co-
operation to liberalize trade and increasing average tariff rates for manufactures 
constitutes negative evidence that there were no two effective paths to liberalization 
after 1860s, while the positive evidence of the European core of the Atlantic economy 
shows that Cobden-Chevalier was an effective instrument to the sustain the 
liberalization dynamic underway before 1860.69 
To conclude, we wish to highlight the general trend of liberalization over the 
whole period, at least until 1870. The world average tariff in 1880 was little more than 
half the 1846 level, no matter if we use trade or population as weights. Of the 35 
countries covered for the whole period (taking Italy as a continuation of Sardinia), 23 
had lower tariffs on manufactures in 1880 than in 1846. Of the remaining dozen, only 
the U.S., Brazil, Colombia, Cuba and Greece had averaged levels above the population 
weighted world average of 17% in 1880. Therefore, we conclude that British 
liberalization after 1846 was typical rather than exceptional of a general trend of 
dismantling Old Regime mercantilism and decreasing political barriers of trade in the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century.  
                                                          
69
 Why it failed to spread beyond Europe and did not allow for sustained liberalization after 1870 or 1875 
is discussed in detail in Lampe, “Explaining Nineteenth-Century Bilateralism.” 
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These results reveal something relevant for our knowledge of the dynamics of 
commercial liberalization in the nineteenth century which followed a general trend and 
was not sparked by any kind of bilateral or multilateral approach. Rules of all kinds of 
countries seem to have decided that it would be favorable to decrease trade barriers for 
manufactured goods. We believe that given our evidence the idea that liberalization first 
took part in Britain, for endogenous political economy reasons or the increasing 
political weight of Enlightenment ideas,70 and then spread from overseas, via 
commercial hegemony, the spread of free trade ideology71 or gunboat diplomacy, 
should be revisited. If unilateral liberalization was underway at least since 1846, 
although reinforced by bilateralism during the 1860s, Britain might not have been alone 
in unilaterally questioning the costs of trade barriers, as it was not alone in dismantling 
them. 
                                                          
70
 See Schonhardt-Bailey, From the Corn Laws, for the former, and Morrison, “Before Hegemony,” for 
an argument from Adam Smith to the evolving political free trade ideology. 
71
 Kindleberger, “Rise of Free Trade.” 
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Table A.1 – Price Data (1846-1880) 
ARTICLES Unit 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880
Measure £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
PAPER Cwts 3,62 3,86 3,17 3,01 3,13 3,05 3,17 3,86 4,15 3,45 3,38 3,62 3,32 3,33 3,35 3,31 3,22 3,24 3,24 3,18 2,95 2,89 2,96 2,83 2,88 2,79 2,91 3,01 2,93 2,91 2,88 2,78 2,69 2,56 2,54
Paper Manufactures (Hangings) Cwts 4,63 4,94 4,06 3,85 4,00 3,90 4,06 4,94 5,30 3,30 3,08 3,53 3,61 3,40 3,41 3,41 3,25 3,26 3,29 3,32 2,71 2,83 2,88 2,85 2,86 2,68 2,82 2,91 2,83 2,97 2,95 2,83 2,93 2,87 2,78
paper for writing Cwts 3,89 4,15 3,41 3,24 3,37 3,28 3,41 4,15 4,46 4,42 4,42 4,59 3,98 4,11 4,05 3,96 3,77 3,77 3,66 3,58 3,46 3,20 3,40 3,09 3,28 3,06 3,06 3,20 3,28 3,23 3,21 3,04 2,86 2,62 2,55
paper of other sorts (not hangings) 2,33 2,49 2,04 1,94 2,02 1,97 2,04 2,49 2,67 2,65 2,65 2,75 2,38 2,46 2,59 2,57 2,65 2,70 2,75 2,65 2,67 2,62 2,59 2,57 2,52 2,62 2,86 2,91 2,67 2,52 2,49 2,46 2,28 2,18 2,31
SILK lbs 0,99 1,00 1,04 1,02 0,96 1,01 1,02 1,07 1,03 1,02 1,13 1,27 1,13 1,18 1,23 1,53 1,57 1,60 1,63 1,57 1,59 1,56 1,54 1,53 1,49 1,56 1,70 1,73 1,59 1,49 1,48 1,46 1,35 1,29 1,37
Silk throwns lbs 0,80 0,78 0,67 0,76 0,76 0,79 0,85 0,88 0,90 0,88 1,08 1,26 1,02 1,11 1,21 1,10 1,13 1,16 1,18 1,13 1,14 1,12 1,11 1,10 1,08 1,12 1,22 1,25 1,14 1,08 1,07 1,05 0,98 0,93 0,99
Silk Manufactures (Broad Piece Goods) lbs 1,18 1,23 1,41 1,28 1,16 1,23 1,20 1,25 1,16 1,16 1,18 1,29 1,23 1,24 1,24 1,95 2,01 2,05 2,09 2,01 2,03 1,99 1,97 1,95 1,91 1,99 2,17 2,21 2,03 1,91 1,89 1,87 1,73 1,65 1,75
Silk Manufactures (Broad stuffs)
IRON AND STEEL MANUFACTURES tons 11,09 10,77 7,98 8,01 7,82 7,49 8,12 11,14 12,87 11,96 12,94 12,67 10,60 10,91 11,00 10,01 10,27 10,67 10,52 9,63 9,85 9,32 9,50 10,71 10,88 11,59 16,26 17,39 13,36 10,64 9,41 8,67 7,78 8,03 9,48
Pig tons 4,07 3,86 2,76 2,58 2,45 1,73 2,32 3,17 4,24 3,68 3,88 3,81 2,99 2,85 3,12 2,68 2,71 2,76 3,03 2,92 3,08 2,86 2,86 2,89 2,96 3,11 5,04 6,23 4,73 3,64 3,12 2,87 2,68 2,58 3,20
Steel bars, angles,shapes(l/Ton) tons 10,03 9,72 7,72 6,47 5,97 5,79 6,00 8,61 9,29 8,57 9,41 9,19 8,10 7,66 7,66 7,29 7,17 7,77 9,18 8,63 8,64 7,78 7,55 7,44 8,14 8,28 11,64 13,10 11,80 9,87 8,77 7,77 7,17 6,64 7,81
Rails tons 8,71 8,53 5,30 5,92 5,74 5,21 5,83 8,08 10,32 9,24 9,42 8,98 7,09 6,73 7,00 6,37 7,00 7,27 7,45 7,09 7,90 7,00 6,91 7,00 7,09 7,63 13,28 15,26 11,40 8,53 7,63 7,09 6,28 6,19 7,09
Galvanised corrugated sheets tons 15,76 15,44 9,59 10,73 10,40 9,43 10,56 14,63 18,69 16,74 17,06 16,25 12,84 12,19 12,68 11,54 12,68 13,16 13,49 12,84 14,30 12,68 12,51 12,68 12,84 13,81 24,05 27,63 20,64 15,44 13,81 12,84 11,38 11,21 12,84
Tinplates tons 16,88 16,29 14,52 14,33 14,52 15,31 15,90 21,20 21,79 21,59 24,93 25,12 21,98 25,12 24,53 22,18 21,79 22,37 19,43 16,68 15,31 16,29 17,66 23,55 23,36 25,12 27,28 24,73 18,25 15,70 13,74 12,76 11,38 13,54 16,49
LEATHER AND MANUFACTURES THEROF Cwts 6,79    7,25    5,95    5,65    5,88    5,72    5,95    7,25    7,78    8,27    8,82    9,62    8,62    8,30    8,78    8,99    9,42    9,40    10,00 9,57    11,27 9,55    9,01    8,33    8,19    8,13    8,78    9,01    8,90    8,90    8,08    8,07    7,31    6,86    7,85    
Calf Skins Cwts 6,79 7,25 5,95 5,65 5,88 5,72 5,95 7,25 7,78 8,27 8,82 9,62 8,62 8,30 8,78 8,99 9,42 9,40 10,00 9,57 11,27 9,55 9,01 8,33 8,19 8,13 8,78 9,01 8,90 8,90 8,08 8,07 7,31 6,86 7,85
Boots and shoes of leather Doz. Pairs 3,22 3,44 2,82 2,68 2,79 2,71 2,82 3,44 3,69 3,66 3,66 3,80 3,29 3,40 3,58 3,55 3,66 3,79 3,67 3,38 3,38 3,48 3,18 3,04 3,08 2,99 2,93 3,24 3,35 3,28 3,17 3,06 3,06 3,03 3,05
COPPER LINGOTS, CAKES , SALABS Cwts 4,14    4,44    3,88    3,84    3,88    3,88    4,44    5,26    5,71    5,69    5,52    5,96    5,21    5,45    5,37    4,96    4,89    4,65    4,88    4,45    4,51    4,06    4,07    4,00    3,73    3,78    4,81    4,68    4,40    4,40    4,13    3,78    3,49    3,17    3,41    
Copper lingots, cakes, slabs Cwts 4,14 4,44 3,88 3,84 3,88 3,88 4,44 5,26 5,71 5,69 5,52 5,96 5,21 5,45 5,37 4,96 4,89 4,65 4,88 4,45 4,51 4,06 4,07 4,00 3,73 3,78 4,81 4,68 4,40 4,40 4,13 3,78 3,49 3,17 3,41
WOLLEN WORSTED MANUFACTURES lbs 0,29    0,28    0,27    0,24    0,21    0,21    0,21    0,23    0,23    0,23    0,23    0,23    0,24    0,26    0,27    0,27    0,31    0,33    0,35    0,37    0,37    0,38    0,35    0,35    0,33    0,36    0,40    0,39    0,37    0,39    0,38    0,37    0,35    0,35    0,36    
Wollen pice light all wool lbs 0,49 0,50 0,48 0,41 0,36 0,38 0,37 0,40 0,37 0,40 0,37 0,37 0,40 0,44 0,46 0,46 0,55 0,59 0,65 0,68 0,70 0,72 0,65 0,67 0,61 0,71 0,80 0,76 0,74 0,79 0,78 0,74 0,70 0,71 0,73
Worsted stuffs all wool lbs 0,16 0,17 0,16 0,15 0,13 0,14 0,13 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,15 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,18 0,19 0,21 0,24 0,22 0,22 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,21 0,21 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,18 0,19
Wollen clothing - flanel lbs 0,21 0,19 0,18 0,15 0,14 0,13 0,12 0,15 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,19 0,18 0,19 0,19 0,19 0,19 0,21 0,20 0,20 0,21 0,20 0,18 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,17 0,18 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,15
LINEN MANUFACTURES lbs 0,088 0,086 0,087 0,068 0,074 0,076 0,082 0,091 0,094 0,090 0,085 0,087 0,087 0,087 0,086 0,085 0,081 0,096 0,100 0,096 0,098 0,093 0,089 0,084 0,085 0,088 0,088 0,091 0,093 0,090 0,085 0,086 0,086 0,084 0,088 
Linen pice goods lbs 0,088 0,086 0,087 0,068 0,074 0,076 0,082 0,091 0,094 0,090 0,085 0,087 0,087 0,087 0,086 0,085 0,081 0,096 0,100 0,096 0,098 0,093 0,089 0,084 0,085 0,088 0,088 0,091 0,093 0,090 0,085 0,086 0,086 0,084 0,088 
COTTON MANUFACTURES lbs 0,083 0,087 0,073 0,072 0,076 0,070 0,074 0,076 0,073 0,074 0,072 0,075 0,073 0,076 0,076 0,074 0,086 0,111 0,126 0,113 0,116 0,100 0,088 0,091 0,086 0,084 0,087 0,086 0,082 0,082 0,077 0,072 0,072 0,068 0,068 
Cotton piece bleached lbs 0,067 0,074 0,060 0,059 0,063 0,060 0,060 0,064 0,059 0,058 0,060 0,062 0,060 0,064 0,064 0,063 0,076 0,104 0,121 0,105 0,106 0,091 0,075 0,079 0,074 0,070 0,073 0,072 0,067 0,065 0,061 0,059 0,056 0,055 0,056 
Cotton piece printed lbs 0,099 0,100 0,086 0,085 0,089 0,080 0,087 0,089 0,086 0,089 0,084 0,087 0,085 0,088 0,088 0,086 0,095 0,118 0,132 0,121 0,126 0,110 0,101 0,102 0,099 0,098 0,100 0,100 0,098 0,099 0,093 0,085 0,087 0,082 0,079 
WOLLEN AND WORSTED YARNS lbs 0,104 0,099 0,092 0,093 0,105 0,101 0,101 0,104 0,099 0,095 0,103 0,115 0,119 0,130 0,135 0,126 0,137 0,155 0,168 0,168 0,160 0,160 0,150 0,149 0,139 0,140 0,155 0,171 0,175 0,161 0,143 0,134 0,125 0,110 0,126 
Wollen carded lbs
Worsted yarn lbs 0,104 0,099 0,092 0,093 0,105 0,101 0,101 0,104 0,099 0,095 0,103 0,115 0,119 0,130 0,135 0,126 0,137 0,155 0,168 0,168 0,160 0,160 0,150 0,149 0,139 0,140 0,155 0,171 0,175 0,161 0,143 0,134 0,125 0,110 0,126 
LINEN YARN (Lbs) lbs 0,045 0,051 0,042 0,042 0,048 0,051 0,048 0,050 0,052 0,051 0,054 0,056 0,055 0,061 0,058 0,059 0,057 0,066 0,074 0,069 0,071 0,078 0,077 0,074 0,060 0,061 0,068 0,069 0,063 0,067 0,065 0,067 0,066 0,062 0,059 
Linen yarns unbleached lbs 0,045 0,051 0,042 0,042 0,048 0,051 0,048 0,050 0,052 0,051 0,054 0,056 0,055 0,061 0,058 0,059 0,057 0,066 0,074 0,069 0,071 0,078 0,077 0,074 0,060 0,061 0,068 0,069 0,063 0,067 0,065 0,067 0,066 0,062 0,059 
COTTON YARNS lbs 0,048 0,050 0,044 0,048 0,049 0,046 0,046 0,047 0,045 0,044 0,044 0,049 0,048 0,049 0,050 0,052 0,067 0,108 0,120 0,100 0,099 0,088 0,084 0,083 0,079 0,078 0,079 0,074 0,066 0,061 0,055 0,054 0,052 0,051 0,055 
Cotton thread for sewing lbs 0,048 0,050 0,044 0,048 0,049 0,046 0,046 0,047 0,045 0,044 0,044 0,049 0,048 0,049 0,050 0,052 0,067 0,108 0,120 0,100 0,099 0,088 0,084 0,083 0,079 0,078 0,079 0,074 0,066 0,061 0,055 0,054 0,052 0,051 0,055 
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Table A.2 – Tariffs on Manufacturing Products Around the Globe, Unweighted Averages 
(1846-1880) 
  1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880
1 Belgium 19.8% 30.8% 24.9% 10.3% 8.6% 8.7% 9.8%
1 Denmark 23.1% 15.8% 14.2% 11.5% 11.1% 11.7% 13.0%
1 France 89.9% 86.5% 70.6% 17.0% 21.1% 22.3% 24.5%
1 Netherlands 5.2% 4.3% 4.0% 3.6% 3.4% 3.4% 2.6%
1 Switzerland 0.4% 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.6% 2.8% 3.2%
1 Zollverein (Germany) 20.6% 23.4% 23.4% 18.4% 9.0% 8.8% 12.8%
2 USA 23.3% 23.3% 17.9% 29.1% 51.3% 49.1% 53.2%
3 Austria-Hungary 58.9% 27.9% 29.3% 26.2% 12.1% 12.3% 15.9%
3 Greece 9.9% 9.8% 19.5% 22.0% 22.5% 22.3% 34.7%
3 Italia    9.4% 8.7% 8.6% 13.3%
3 Norway 23.4% 22.7% 16.9% 12.1% 7.6% 6.0% 6.8%
3 Portugal 73.9% 66.2% 60.1% 45.8% 51.3% 51.2% 47.0%
3 Roman (Papal) States 38.8% 34.9% 23.2% 19.2% 13.8%  
3 Romania 3.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.5% 5.5% 12.9%
3 Russia 165.8% 104.7% 48.8% 54.4% 48.9% 50.6% 62.4%
3 Sardinia 42.2% 17.3% 12.6%    
3 Spain 83.1% 65.6% 60.2% 50.6% 37.2% 38.1% 42.5%
3 Sweden 56.4% 45.0% 18.9% 16.3% 10.3% 10.6% 11.8%
4 Argentina  13.1% 9.3% 11.6% 18.7% 19.4% 23.7%
4 Brazil 26.5% 26.5% 26.0% 26.7% 26.3% 32.0% 35.0%
4 Chile 34.5% 23.3% 21.9% 21.1% 22.3% 23.2% 26.1%
4 Colombia (New Granada) 42.8% 44.8% 33.2% 33.0% 49.8% 39.7% 58.1%
4 Mexico 144.5% 113.9% 92.7% 75.3% 77.9% 99.0% 111.2%
4 Peru 23.3% 23.1% 19.3% 17.7% 17.7% 17.0% 17.4%
4 Uruguay 27.0% 26.2% 17.3% 10.0% 11.9% 17.3% 15.9%
4 Venezuela 54.7% 70.2% 51.1% 51.2% 29.8% 36.0% 41.1%
5 Australia (Victoria) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 5.7% 5.7% 7.4%
5 Canada 4.9% 11.7% 15.0% 15.3% 13.0% 12.2% 16.6%
5 New Zealand 0.0% 10.0% 1.9% 1.5% 4.6% 9.0% 12.5%
6 China 5.4% 5.2% 5.1% 4.9% 5.9% 5.7% 6.4%
6 Cuba 26.4% 28.4% 25.8% 28.0% 50.1% 61.4% 70.3%
6 Hong Kong 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
6 India 2.6% 4.0% 7.7% 4.4% 5.9% 5.8% 4.7%
6 Jamaica  4.0% 12.2% 12.2% 12.1% 12.1% 12.1%
6 Japan   17.3% 17.3% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
6 Java (Dutch East Indies) 
Indies) 
21.2% 12.0% 12.0% 11.0% 5.4% 5.4%
6 Morocco 13.3% 15.9% 18.2% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%
6 South Africa 5.0% 5.0% 7.5% 7.5% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%
6 Tunez   8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%
6 Turkey (incl. Egypt) 3.1% 2.9% 2.8% 7.4% 7.7% 7.7% 8.1%
6 Zanzibar 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
 
 
Note: Sorted by “Country Clubs” (column 1, see Table 2) 
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Table A.3 – Tariffs on manufacturing products around the world, trade  
weighted averages (1846-1880) 
  1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880 
1 Belgium 22.6% 51.3% 44.7% 16.0% 18.1% 20.1% 26.1% 
1 Denmark 33.6% 22.2% 20.2% 12.9% 14.3% 15.5% 19.2% 
1 France 107.5% 82.6% 69.1% 22.6% 24.2% 24.0% 23.5% 
1 Netherlands 4.6% 4.4% 3.7% 4.0% 3.8% 4.0% 3.6% 
1 Switzerland 0.4% 3.1% 3.0% 4.0% 2.9% 2.8% 3.4% 
1 Zollverein (Germany) 45.5% 49.9% 52.1% 30.2% 14.5% 14.1% 22.6% 
2 USA 24.6% 24.7% 20.4% 34.0% 63.2% 63.5% 75.4% 
3 Austria-Hungary 129.6% 48.9% 52.4% 33.1% 17.9% 17.2% 28.1% 
3 Greece 9.9% 9.9% 15.5% 21.9% 19.9% 20.3% 44.8% 
3 Italia 11.3% 11.4% 11.6% 18.0% 
3 Norway 39.5% 38.9% 25.9% 9.7% 9.6% 8.7% 11.0% 
3 Portugal 53.4% 56.3% 54.5% 40.6% 47.2% 49.2% 56.9% 
3 Roman (Papal) States 39.5% 35.6% 26.5% 20.6% 14.3% 
3 Romania 3.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.5% 5.5% 12.2% 
3 Russia 217.2% 152.5% 81.9% 65.8% 72.7% 80.6% 106.9% 
3 Sardinia 54.2% 24.1% 20.3% 
3 Spain 136.2% 83.6% 81.8% 68.0% 50.3% 50.7% 59.9% 
3 Sweden 68.0% 61.6% 30.3% 16.5% 15.8% 17.8% 22.9% 
4 Argentina 12.7% 11.0% 12.4% 18.1% 18.0% 21.6% 
4 Brazil 26.5% 26.8% 22.2% 24.5% 24.7% 31.5% 39.4% 
4 Chile 34.1% 23.0% 22.9% 21.4% 23.5% 23.8% 25.8% 
4 Colombia (New Granada) 65.6% 52.6% 43.0% 41.0% 50.3% 45.2% 74.1% 
4 Mexico 157.3% 125.5% 98.4% 78.2% 79.8% 110.1% 130.9% 
4 Peru 23.5% 23.0% 18.3% 17.3% 17.6% 18.2% 18.6% 
4 Uruguay 30.4% 29.0% 16.1% 10.9% 12.6% 18.6% 17.1% 
4 Venezuela 65.9% 87.0% 63.1% 43.8% 24.9% 40.7% 47.7% 
5 Australia (Victoria) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 6.6% 6.8% 9.6% 
5 Canada 4.9% 11.2% 16.3% 15.5% 13.7% 12.1% 17.1% 
5 New Zealand 0.0% 15.5% 3.2% 1.9% 5.2% 10.0% 14.4% 
6 China 5.4% 5.6% 5.6% 5.8% 6.3% 5.9% 6.9% 
6 Cuba 25.1% 30.5% 25.8% 28.0% 49.3% 58.7% 67.5% 
6 Hong Kong 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 India 1.7% 3.0% 5.3% 3.8% 5.0% 4.9% 4.5% 
6 Jamaica 4.0% 12.0% 11.9% 11.8% 11.9% 11.9% 
6 Japan 11.1% 12.8% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
6 Java (Dutch East Indies) 23.3% 12.0% 12.0% 12.2% 6.0% 6.0% 
6 Morocco 13.9% 20.3% 24.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
6 South Africa 5.0% 5.0% 7.5% 7.5% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
6 Tunez 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
6 Turkey (incl. Egypt) 3.0% 2.5% 2.5% 7.5% 7.7% 7.6% 7.8% 
6 Zanzibar 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
Note: Sorted by “Country Clubs” (column 1, see Table 2), weights are British export shares in each year. 
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Table A.4 – Tariffs on manufacturing products around the world, 
unweighted variances (1846-1880) 
  1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880 
1 Belgium 0.0228 0.0649 0.0552 0.0062 0.0115 0.0125 0.0192 
1 Denmark 0.0124 0.0061 0.0057 0.0057 0.0054 0.0053 0.0070 
1 France 0.7557 0.8217 0.7223 0.0197 0.0467 0.0717 0.0868 
1 Netherlands 0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
1 Switzerland 0.0000 0.0006 0.0008 0.0019 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 
1 Zollverein (Germany) 0.0592 0.0667 0.0689 0.0365 0.0067 0.0055 0.0106 
2 USA 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 0.0109 0.0411 0.0427 0.0686 
3 Austria-Hungary 0.7102 0.0694 0.0756 0.0546 0.0158 0.0151 0.0287 
3 Greece 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 0.0261 0.0373 0.0308 0.0729 
3 Italia 
   
0.0034 0.0021 0.0022 0.0074 
3 Norway 0.0291 0.0384 0.0155 0.0057 0.0034 0.0025 0.0034 
3 Portugal 0.6383 0.5360 0.3650 0.2578 0.3425 0.2810 0.1441 
3 Roman (Papal) States 0.0663 0.0472 0.0261 0.0227 0.0063 
  
3 Romania 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 
3 Russia 1.3933 0.7297 0.1382 0.3034 0.2316 0.2436 0.3458 
3 Sardinia 0.1280 0.0105 0.0070 
    
3 Spain 0.4987 0.1708 0.1685 0.1317 0.0349 0.0425 0.0488 
3 Sweden 0.1741 0.1393 0.0291 0.0175 0.0093 0.0098 0.0146 
4 Argentina 
 
0.0017 0.0023 0.0023 0.0016 0.0008 0.0020 
4 Brazil 0.0020 0.0020 0.0260 0.0067 0.0064 0.0085 0.0150 
4 Chile 0.0711 0.0020 0.0023 0.0031 0.0016 0.0010 0.0030 
4 Colombia (New 
Granada) 
0.0846 0.0632 0.0443 0.1540 0.2218 0.1144 0.3763 
4 Mexico 0.5144 0.5884 0.2383 0.1007 0.1117 0.1752 0.2252 
4 Peru 0.0049 0.0110 0.0025 0.0052 0.0052 0.0055 0.0046 
4 Uruguay 0.0161 0.0154 0.0143 0.0032 0.0015 0.0040 0.0015 
4 Venezuela 0.1226 0.1985 0.1463 0.1130 0.0498 0.0439 0.0601 
5 Australia (Victoria) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0018 0.0018 0.0030 
5 Canada 0.0000 0.0006 0.0048 0.0050 0.0021 0.0026 0.0017 
5 New Zealand 0.0000 0.0036 0.0008 0.0006 0.0010 0.0010 0.0024 
6 China 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0010 0.0011 0.0009 0.0010 
6 Cuba 0.0118 0.0112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0213 0.0475 0.0571 
6 Hong Kong 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
6 India 0.0002 0.0004 0.0017 0.0015 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
6 Jamaica 
 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
6 Japan 
  
0.0037 0.0037 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
6 Java (Dutch East Indies) 0.0033 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0042 0.0004 0.0004 
6 Morocco 0.0118 0.0380 0.0734 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
6 South Africa 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
6 Tunez 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
6 Turkey (incl. Egypt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 
6 Zanzibar 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
Note: Sorted by “Country Clubs” (column 1, see Table 2) 
49 
 
Table A.5 – Tariffs on Manufacturing Products Around the Globe, Trade  
Weighted Variances (1846-1880) 
    1846 1853 1859 1863 1870 1875 1880 
 1 Belgium 0.0278 0.0840 0.0956 0.0079 0.0298 0.0355 0.0628 
 1 Denmark 0.0216 0.0084 0.0132 0.0072 0.0085 0.0099 0.0170 
 1 France 1.1063 1.0638 0.8771 0.0214 0.0495 0.0776 0.0835 
 1 Netherlands 0.0008 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 
 1 Switzerland 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 0.0035 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 
 1 Zollverein (Germany) 0.1451 0.1395 0.1550 0.0625 0.0083 0.0078 0.0215 
 2 USA 0.0009 0.0008 0.0011 0.0144 0.0455 0.0587 0.1065 
 3 Austria-Hungary 1.6212 0.1492 0.1455 0.0668 0.0190 0.0205 0.0660 
 3 Greece 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.0255 0.0282 0.0250 0.1447 
 3 Italia    0.0056 0.0031 0.0047 0.0079 
 3 Norway 0.0861 0.1134 0.0257 0.0025 0.0064 0.0056 0.0094 
 3 Portugal 0.2085 0.1206 0.1075 0.1382 0.1690 0.1532 0.1948 
 3 Roman (Papal) States 0.0360 0.0270 0.0269 0.0317 0.0039   
 3 Romania 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0032 
 3 Russia 1.3848 0.6648 0.3292 0.3287 0.3944 0.4861 0.7942 
 3 Sardinia 0.1444 0.0139 0.0056     
 3 Spain 0.8804 0.2333 0.2252 0.1847 0.0361 0.0532 0.0769 
 3 Sweden 0.2230 0.2328 0.0745 0.0224 0.0237 0.0280 0.0482 
 4 Argentina  0.0020 0.0029 0.0030 0.0015 0.0013 0.0029 
 4 Brazil 0.0021 0.0017 0.0169 0.0104 0.0105 0.0149 0.0406 
 4 Chile 0.0350 0.0028 0.0028 0.0049 0.0010 0.0008 0.0025 
 
4 Colombia (New 
Granada) 
0.1491 0.0667 0.0604 0.2711 0.1403 0.1604 0.5509 
 4 Cuba 0.0114 0.0189 0.0000 0.0000 0.0127 0.0317 0.0390 
 4 Mexico 0.3331 0.3915 0.3054 0.0880 0.0830 0.0939 0.1667 
 4 Peru 0.0028 0.0112 0.0024 0.0042 0.0037 0.0033 0.0028 
 4 Uruguay 0.0130 0.0162 0.0096 0.0044 0.0019 0.0043 0.0018 
 4 Venezuela 0.0756 0.1679 0.2066 0.0596 0.0247 0.0604 0.0897 
 5 Australia (Victoria) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0018 0.0017 0.0034 
 5 Canada 0.0000 0.0012 0.0040 0.0045 0.0011 0.0015 0.0007 
 5 New Zealand 0.0000 0.0035 0.0010 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0009 
 6 China 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0012 0.0011 0.0008 0.0009 
 6 Hong Kong 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 6 India 0.0003 0.0007 0.0030 0.0014 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
 6 Jamaica  0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 6 Japan   0.0071 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 6 Java (Dutch East Indies) 0.0022  0.0000 0.0000 0.0051 0.0002 0.0002 
 6 Morocco 0.0165 0.0726 0.1395 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 6 South Africa 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 6 Tunez   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 6 Turkey 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
 6 Zanzibar 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Note: Sorted by “Country Clubs” (column 1, see Table 2) 
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Table A.6: Adjustments for prohibitions or extremely high duties 
A: Prohibitions (substituted with twice the specific or ad valorem rate in the first period after 
repeal). The rate given below is the one included for our calculations in current prices. 
Mexico:  Leather: 1846: 283%, 1853: 265%; Copper: 1846: 145%, 1853: 145%; Cotton Yarns: 1846: 
213%, 1853: 220% 
Spain: Leather: 1846: 116%; Cottons: 1846: 200%; Cotton Yarns: 1846: 224%  
 
B. Ad valorem equivalents higher than 300% where the 300% cap was applied. The rates given 
below are the ad valorem equivalent in current prices which was substituted by the 300% 
maximum. 
France: Cotton Yarns: 1846: 337%, 1853: 349%, 1859: 331%  
Portugal (1846): Linen Yarns 482%  
Russia (1846): Iron and Steel 314%, Leather 371%, Linens 1467%, Cottons 486%  
Russia (1853): Linens 368% 
 
 
